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Korean Conflict Imminent

Posted by Bob Kohm on December 19, 2010

I’m going to resurrect the blog for the next few days to chronicle what I suspect will be the outbreak of open hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, continuing my commentary from RotoJunkie.com

As the situation stands on Sunday afternoon in the US and overnight in Korea, the skies over Pyongyang and the DMZ have cleared and all indications are that the South Koreans will carry through their promised live fire exercise on Yeonpyeong Island in the morning.

The UN Security Council emergency session, taking place  today at the behest of the Russians to try and stop the RoK artillery exercise and defuse tensions, will amount to nothing as the Americans are not on board. Politically South Korea (henceforth the RoK) can not draw down from these exercises as the government almost fell over the lack of response to the North’s shelling of civilian targets on Yeonpyeong on 23 November.

The Background

Taking a look back at the origins of this crisis and to give a general primer on the strategic situation on the Peninsula, the immediate roots of this crisis lie in two acts of North Korean aggression, the sinking of the corvette Cheonan on 26 March 2010 and the aforementioned shelling of Yeonpyeong. Military aggression from the North  (the DPRK) is not a new phenomenon; over the years they have fired across the DMZ too many times to count, have been caught landing commandos via mini-sub inside the RoK’s borders, have shot down reconnaissance planes and famously took captive the USS Pueblo back in the late ’60s. This year’s events, however, have reflected a departure from the norms of DPRK aggression both in terms of scale and targeting.

The Cheonan was most likely sunk by a DPRK mini-sub not far from Yeonpyeong near the holy disputed “Northern Limit Line” in the Yellow Sea, a maritime boundary separating RoK water from DPRK water somewhat arbitrarily drawn by US General Mark Clark at the end of the 1950-3 Korean Conflict. Sinking this ship with its large crew marked a decided and especially provocative escalation in the types of attacks the North was willing to perpetrate. The subsequent shelling of Yeonpyeong represented the first intentional targeting of civilians and civilian areas since the 1953 Armistice and has had a huge impact on the South Korean public’s outlook on intra-Korean relations.

The South’s response to both incidents, and particularly the Cheonan, was perceived both internally and abroad as being somewhat feeble. After the sinking, the South made some nasty declarations about protecting its own, went to the UN with proof of the North sinking the ship after raising it from the floor of the Yellow Sea, held a few naval demonstrations and largely nothing more despite the high death toll aboard the stricken vessel. The response to Yeonpyeong was little better at first– increased caterwauling about the North cutting it out, threats of retaliation “next time” and very showy tours and exercises on the island. The South Korean population had had enough of that behavior, however, and as a result the RoK’s Defense Minister was sacked by the government of President Lee. Shortly after– and hugely against the wishes of the Chinese– a large scale naval exercise was held with the US Navy in the Yellow Sea, which China considers to be off limits to the major navies of the world. The point was made that the United States would stand behind its RoK alliance by inserting the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group (CSG) into the Yellow Sea and revealing that our most advanced attack submarine, the USS Jimmy Carter, had already been operating in the Yellow Sea before the Yeonpyeong strike occurred. That was followed by US-Japanese exercises off of the East Coast of North Korea, some uncharacteristically tough talk from President Lee both at home and abroad, and ultimately the scheduling of the current artillery live fire exercise.

The reason for the RoK’s repeated timidity in the face of DPRK aggression lies just over 30 miles north of Seoul. Emplaced along the DMZ are over one hundred North Korean 170mm “Koksan” artillery pieces capable of putting direct fire on any target in Seoul in addition to as many as several dozen 240mm Multiple Rocket Launch Systems capable of putting artillery rockets into Seoul, as well. These weapons are located in hardened postions called HARTs (Hardened ARTillery) and would be somewhat difficult to destroy before they managed to fire several volleys. It is that capability, along with the very large reserve of SCUD-variant, LUNA-M, NK-02 and FROG artillery missiles further north that have dialed down the RoK’s will to retaliate in the past– they have an awful lot to lose by escalating a crisis with Pyongyang. How much?  Many authorities foresee up to one million casualties in Seoul in the first two hours from full artillery bombardment by the North using only conventional warheads. I don’t agree that casualties on that scale would occur as the US & RoK would silence or disrupt many of those those guns and launchers within less than an hour, but it would still be a disastrous occurrence. Apparently the South Koreans have overcome that fear this time around, however, as it is the normally dovish population that is driving the calls for retaliation.

With that brief history in hand it is easy to see that the situation on the Peninsula has moved in a new direction as 2010 has played itself out. As mentioned earlier, the RoK is not in a political position in which it can stop the scheduled exercise in the face of North Korean threats— and North Korean threats have been dire. This week alone the DPRK has threatened to attack not only Yeonpyeong but also, depending on the speaker, two, three, or more other sites, to hit US assets in Japan with missile fire, to use its nuclear weapons, or to take on the US Navy. Much of this rhetoric is being driven by succession planning within the DPRK, as the reign of Kim Jong Il draws to an end and he tries to hand power to his son, Kim Jong Un, against the will of some factions of the military and possibly the regime in Beijing, the North’s most important supporter. Kim Jong Un is seen as a weak pretender by many, just as his father was when he took the reins of power from his father, Kim Il Sung. It seems evident that the Kims are ratcheting up tensions with the hope of stopping them at the tipping point to show that Kim Jong Un is not only ready to command but is essential to the continued existence of the Stalinist regime. Their ability to stop them, however, seems to be predicated on the RoK acting as it always has and refusing to escalate military tensions and the United States not rocking the boat. Today this seems a  highly flawed premise.

The Coming (?) Storm

Ever since the joint naval maneuvers in the Yellow Sea, the United States Navy has been putting more and more assets into play in the Western Pacific. Last weekend the Navy surged an incredible nine nuclear attack submarines to sea in a 72 hour period, and this week two more have set out putting an extraordinary 67% of our nuclear attack subs at sea. Joining them are as many as three (and my money is on all three) of the most powerful undersea combatants ever built, the Ohio-class cruise missile subs (SSGNs). These boats are a rare glimpse into what the US military can do when it works with a good idea and stays within budget to recycle assets instead of giving General Dynamics carte blanche to spend taxpayer money. Each of these boats are a converted Trident submarine that has had its ballistic missile launch systems removed and replaced by 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles optimized for land attack. In addition, the boats are specialized intelligence and special ops platforms, with lockout chamber and mini-craft to covertly deliver SEAL teams to the beach and all manner of electronic intelligence gathering capabilities.

On the surface things get no better for the North Koreans. At the conclusion of its joint exercises with the Japanese, the George Washington CSG returned to its home port of Yokosuka, Japan with the announcement that it would be in port through the holidays and New Year. Earlier this week the Washington CSG returned to the sea with no prior announcement. The CSG is comprised of the carrier and its air wing, a Ticonderoga class AEGIS cruiser, an Arleigh Burke class AEGIS destroyer, a nuclear attack sub and attached frigates for anti-submarine (ASW) defense. It is the basic building block of American power projection and each of our ten CSGs outpower the entire navies of most other countries. The presence of the USS Essex Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is confirmed in the Yellow Sea and consists of the Essex, a “baby” carrier loaded with USMC AV-8b Harrier strike fighters, Sea Cobra attack helicopters and various troop transport & ASW choppers along with an USMC Expeditionary Group, consisting of a reinforced battalion of Marines with full equipment along with the same cruiser, destroyer, frigate and submarine assets of the CSG.

Potentially coming into play will be the USS Carl Vinson CSG, currently underway in the Pacific (more on them in a bit) and the USS Ronald Reagan CSG, also in the Pacific and coming off of its pre-deployment trials. The USS Boxer ESG is also in the Pacific and may be moving towards Korea already. The prospect of the combined striking power of three CSGs and two ESGs along with the Ohio SSGNs and the various Improved Los Angeles and Seawolf attack subs is, in a word, massive.

Not to be left out is the US Air Force, which has been known to deploy its B2 Spirit stealth bombers to Andersen AFB in Guam and which would play an important role in a US strategic campaign against the DPRK. Coupled with B1 Lancers and B52 Stratofortresses, the strategic assets of the USAF will come into play early in the game if escalation becomes inevitable. The US also maintains large numbers of  tactical fighters and fighter-bombers in South Korea and Japan that would round out our air supremacy package with the Korean F-15s and Navy F-18s.

The Koreans feature a formidable military designed precisely to strike quickly and deep into the DPRK with American backing. Their Air Force is first rate, featuring many modern US aircraft types such as F-15 and -16 variants along with older F-4 & F-5s and their Army features superb tanks (unlikely to be used here) and ample supplies of attack helicopters. Training across Korean Forces is superb and their Special Operations Forces are amongst the world’s elite.

In addition to US & RoK forces, the Japanese, who have grown very concerned with the unstable nuclear armed regime occupying a portion of the peninsula historically known by the sobriquet “The Dagger Pointed at the Heart of Japan”, have put a large portion of their formidable naval assets to sea in the past two weeks in response to the growing tensions.

The Deadly Wildcard

In the face of so much opposition it would seem that the North should back down, but there has been growing evidence over the past few years that coupled with the attitude that the RoK is “too soft” to withstand attacks on Seoul and thus will never attack the North, is the reliance on the North’s fledgling nuclear weapons program to stop the US from moving against them. Having often both heard and expressed the idea that having a nuclear weapon makes you too dangerous for the United States to ever take on, the Kim regime has poured a high percentage of its scarce resources into developing, with assistance from Pakistan and Iran, nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them.

North Korea’s history of testing their nukes is a bit spotty, to say the least. Their first  declared test, in Ocotber of 2006, may or may not have been an actual nuclear detonation at all but a staged event with massed conventional explosives.  Even if it was a nuclear test, it would have been regarded as a “fizzle”– meaning that a self sustaining nuclear chain reaction was not maintained long enough to extract the maximum potential of the blast. They seem to have done better in 2009, setting off a blast that was roughly the equivalent of the Nagasaki atomic bomb. They have been frantically working on a third test, with news comign out this week that they’ve dug a 500 foot pit to conduct it in.

If we assume a small stockpile of dodgy nuclear weapons in North Korea’s hands, the next questions become “Can they deliver them?” and “Under what circumstances?”. Neither is easy to answer. The North has launched several variants of the SCUD (locally called the Nodong) series of missiles of Iraq fame with great success; these missiles have greater ranges, higher payloads and in some cases better accuracy than the ones Saddam Hussein fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia in the First Gulf War. They have certainly been outfitted with chemical warheads and likely biologicals in addition to high explosive conventionals (unlike Iraq, the DPRK WMD programs are well documented), and Kim has claimed that they’ve been fitted with nuclear warheads as well. That is unconfirmed. The Koreans have also built the longer range Taepodong-1 and Rodong-1 missiles, capable of hitting Japan and the US bases in that nation and again claimed by Kim to be nuclear armed. The Taepodong-2, which has been tested but has never flown successfully, is a true ICBM made to take a nuclear warhead to America’s West Coast with all cities from Anchorage to San Diego and all of Hawaii theoretically in range. An attempt in 2009 to launch one of these as a satellite booster failed when the second and third stages, with the payload, fell into the Pacific.

If it chose to, there is little doubt that the North could at least make a credible attempt to put a nuclear weapon on Seoul or any other RoK location and could very possibly make a credible attempt to hit Tokyo or American bases at Yokosuka or Okinawa and perhaps even Guam with nuclear weapons.  The immediate result of that would likely be the total destruction of North Korea’s ability to make war and, depending on targets hit, the population of North Korea could well be targeted as well. North Korea’s nuclear program is centered at Yongbyong and at a select few other locations, all heavily hardened to the extent of being built into and under mountains. They would be almost impossible to destroy with any conventional weaponry currently known to exist and would necessitate the use of American nuclear weapons to destroy. Fortunately the regime is more afraid of losing control of its weapons than it is of the US taking them out, so they are kept at a very few sites and not spread all over the place. Unfortunately those sites, being buried, would require in my opinion the employment of multiple penetrating and ground-bursting US weapons, the absolute dirtiest employment of nuclear arms from a fallout standpoint. South Korea, Tokyo, the major naval base and population center at Vladivostok in Russia and areas of China could all be in the fallout pattern at the caprice of the winds.

What situations could produce a nuclear exchange? With Kim that crystal ball is very hard to read given his instability and history of making good on threats. Just this week his regime has threatened to hit targets within and without the RoK with nuclear weapons and the Japanese are notably rattled by that; it is thought that US ballistic missile defense ships are likely on station between Japan and Korea as well as at Okinawa and Guam. How would Kim react to Pyongyang being bombed, as it possibly will be if the North hits the RoK tonight? What if the South mobilized and signaled an impending invasion (they haven’t at this point)? How will Kim react to American air power coming out of Japan? There are rumours of a North Korean nuclear torpedo and nuclear seabed mines– would they dare to try to employ them against a United States Navy CSG or ESG?

There are no great answers to what is clearly the greatest question of fighting the North Koreans.

If it became apparent that an all out war was going to begin in Korea involving ground forces, be aware that most authorities agree that American doctrine for fighting the Soviets throughout the Cold War was to employ tactical nuclear weapons not only first but immediately, and my supposition is that doctrine would apply to North Korea as well to prevent them from getting a shot off at Seoul or Tokyo and killing millions. You can bet that there are one or more likely more than one Ohio-class nuclear missile subs (SSBNs) off the Korean Coast this afternoon set to fire depressed trajectory missiles that would arrive on target in under ten minutes.

Conclusions

It is highly likely that at least limited artillery exchanges and air strikes will be carried out over the next 8-24 hours in Korea in response to the live fire exercise at Yeonpyeong Island. Once the first shot is fired, it will be difficult and may prove to be impossible to stop escalations over the following 72 hours, which could see severe civilian casualties in and around the RoK’s national capital area. DPRK doctrine has always heavily relied upon special forces raids and over the years many DPRK special forces cells have been uncovered in the South; the possibility for terrorist style attacks on civilian and government targets throughout the South and possibly in the Japanese home islands certainly exists. It is my belief that the United States will not be involved in the first stage of retaliatory strikes against the North outside of air defense missions unless US forces are previously targeted or heavy civilian casualties occur, but US intelligence and aerial recon elements along with Special Forces (most likely SEALs) are almost certainly already being used and are in place in North Korean territory. If a second or third round of retaliatory strikes happen, it is certain in my opinion that US forces will become actively embroiled in the fighting, largely from the sea and air. I do not anticipate in any case a 1950-style invasion of the South; the DPRK ‘s tanks are so mechanically poor that they likely couldn’t cover the distance without massive mechanical support that they don’t have available. It is also the onset of winter in Korea, meaning harsh conditions but rivers that have not yet frozen solid enough for the North to use them. The possibility of a last minute coup or one that occurs early in an exchange is also not to be discounted– the Chinese and Russians want no part of a war to be fought on their doorstep and they both hold sway with factions within the DPRK government and military. Russia and China have both deployed troops to their respective borders with North Korea and can be assumed to be at a heightened state of military readiness; while their engagement in the fighting is extremely unlikely, it cannot be forgotten that China has been here before and that neither China nor Russia would look kindly on an American ally having a border so close to so many vital Chinese and Russians national security locales and assets. If fighting does come, it will most likely largely consist of air strikes and artillery duels at the outset followed by heightened air and naval engagements and the potential usage of any class of WMDs by the North if Pyongyang starts taking appreciable damage and the regime looks as if it might fall. That stage could be reached at any point after the first DPRK artillery shell falls or specal ops raid occurs and it is that unpredictability that makes this the geopolitically terrifying scenario that it is.

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Posted in China, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence (and lack thereof), Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Warfare | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Killing the Assassination Story

Posted by Bob Kohm on July 14, 2009

Something isn’t right in Langley, on the Hill, or in the newsrooms. Amidst the sturm und drang of the latest CIA-Congressional blowup over no-oversight covert ops the story has started to emerge that the program in question was centered on hit teams finding and then taking out al Qaeda leaders in the Middle East and South Asia. That’s all very dramatic… but is it all that believable?

Hit teams and assassination programs are the stuff of spy novels and Tom Cruise movies, but drones are the stuff of this war and that’s the major problem I’m having with the “revelation” that the entire imbroglio is over an assassination plot. What would make Dick Cheney order the CIA to withhold information from what at the time the order was given was a galvanized, Republican Congress when the groundwork was already being laid for the not terribly covert Predator program, which was acknowledged to be operational in 2002 but which may have been in action even before that?

To my mind, nothing. Yes, Dick Cheney did some fairly stupid stuff with connection to the intelligence community– Valerie Plame, anyone?– and him ordering the CIA to withold information from the Congress isn’t that far a bridge to cross in terms of believability, of course. Still, to issue that order almost immediately after 9-11, when you could’ve gotten a Republican Congress (or a Democratic one, for that matter) to stay quiet about, oh, a massive program of snatching suspects from both friendly and hostile nations, spiriting them away to foreign nations to be tortured into giving up information and then dumping them in Cuba– that doesn’t add up, even with Dick Cheney’s penchant for bloody mindedness.

This strikes me as an attempted deception– someone picked a spy novel premise that seemed to them like something the public would suck up while being just appalled enough to say, “Oh that CIA, they’ve done it again!” It’s damage control 101– when you are going to get tagged with something you really don’t want to be tagged with, admit to something embarrassing– people stop looking because they themselves can’t stand to be publicly embarrassed and can’t understand that you would willingly embarrass yourself to dodge the greater bullet. People look away when they see something embarrassing, and that’s precisely what the CIA wants to have happen here– they want us to look away.

In the end I have no idea what this program was, if Congress or even the President know what it is at this point, if it involved assassination or something else, or if Cheney even ordered it covered up. It could be a huge issue borne of post- 9/11 excess or it could be a tempest in a teapot conjured up in the Speaker’s office to draw attention away from some of Nancy’s recent foibles. I am confident, however, that this wasn’t all about some silly plot to set up hit teams to pursue al Qaeda leaders and hide them from the Congress. Hit teams to go after Saudi Royals funding al Qaeda?

Now that would be a story worthy of hiding from Congress.

Posted in Afghanistan, American Politics, CongressCritters, Intelligence (and lack thereof) | Leave a Comment »

The Spy Who Sagged Me

Posted by Bob Kohm on July 7, 2009

Just in case you think we Americans are the only ones who get themselves tangled in meaningless scandals and news stories that bear no resemblance to news, the Brits have really gotten themselves twisted over a pair of saggy Speedos.

It seems that the head of MI6, Sir John Sawers (that’s “M” to you, Bond fans…) wears Speedos while, like oh so many Euros, he clearly shouldn’t. The issue has slouched into the public consciousness by means of Facebook; it seems that Sir John’s wife has breached his, uhm, operational security by publishing a photo of her hubby in his full glory on her Facebook page, which was promptly found by everyone from the Murdoch papers to the BBC to… and here’s the earth shattering problem… the TERRORISTS!!!

It seems that some in the UK are quite concerned that the nefarious folks who wish to see the sun set ont he British Empire now have some advantage over Her Majesty’s stalwart spymaster because they’ve seen him hanging gut over his Speedos. The tight shot (…oh, how lamentably tight…), as you can see, shows Sir John, some sand, some rocks, and a few other people’s (better defined) legs. Apparently, according to The Mail, this blows Sir John’s cover… or at least exposes his need for a cover-up.

Of course, Sir John was publicly announced as the head of MI6, his home address is well known, and while most would’ve presumed he wore full swim trunks I’m not sure that his penchant for Speedos portends the official translation of “God Save the Queen” to Arabic.

Rule, Brittania.

Posted in Cultural Phenomena, Intelligence (and lack thereof), Uncategorized | Leave a Comment »

Skivvies and Soundwaves

Posted by Bob Kohm on March 10, 2009

Sometimes the greatest crises start in the silliest ways.

Earlier this week, in what on the surface sounds like a navalized version of the Keystone Kops, Chinese fishing boats and coastal patrol boats surrounded and harassed an unarmed American ocean surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, waving large Chinese flags and taunting the crew while generally making life uncomfortable for the much larger ship. When Chinese seamen tried to snag the long sonar cables that Impeccable was towing, the American crew turned high pressure fire hoses on the Chinese… who promptly stripped to their underwear and continued taunting until the American ship departed the area.

It all sounds very juvenile, a slightly higher stakes game of penis waving on the high seas. In reality, it was the largest incident in a week-long series of events that portend major problems for US-PRC relations as Chinese Premier Hu Jintao prepares for his initial meeting with President Obama in two weeks.

USNS Impeccable is, without question, an interesting ship. Operated by the US Military Sealift Command, Impeccable is an “ocean surveillance” ship, whose stated mission is oceanographic research and investigation. It is, of course, in actuality a major intelligence platform, part of the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) system tasked to gather intelligence on and keep track of enemy submarine forces. Impeccable carries the most sophisticated and sensitive sonar arrays in the American inventory, capable of locating and tracking submarines at ranges of hundreds of miles under the right circumstances and also making recordings which can be enhanced and downloaded to the fleet and by which our submarines and surface combatants can positively identify enemy subs. Given that Impeccable was operating in international waters off of China’s new submarine base at Hainan Island, its mission was clearly tracking the new generation of Chinese subs stationed there.

To understand the Chinese sensitivity to spying on its submarines it is necessary to look back at the 1995-’96 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The Chinese, in the run-ups to the 1996 Taiwanese elections, decided to flex their muscles to dissuade Taiwanese voters for voting for a pro-independence government by conducting a series of “missile tests” that overflew Taiwan and several live fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait. Responding to the Chinese provocations, President Clinton ordered Navy Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) into the area, with USS Nimitz transiting the Strait in December of 1995 and then again in March 1996 with the USS Kitty Hawk battlegroup. The Chinese got the message—if American CBGs could operate in the Strait, they could destroy China’s economic and military heart, which exists along the Chinese Pacific Coast. This changed China’s entire military development program, causing them to see the Taiwan Strait as the key to their national sovereignty. As it is realistically very difficult to challenge America’s CBGs from the surface or air, China turned to the third attack venue—undersea—to stop America from threatening the Chinese littoral again.

China has spent extraordinary amounts of money over the past decade in developing its attack submarine forces in the hope that swarms of Chinese subs could make entering the restricted waters of the Taiwan Strait too risky for the American carriers, standing them off to the fuel limits of their embarked air wings and thus greatly complicating American participation in any future PRC-Taiwan crisis. The quality of the newer Chinese nuclear subs, however, is extremely questionable—the Chinese are not, to be polite, particularly good at naval development and have suffered many problems in their undersea programs. Their boats are quite noisy, the kiss of death for a sub, and their seaworthiness has not been demonstrated to be adequate for extended operations on a regular schedule. There is a school of thought, however, that suggests the newer Chinese boats coming on line have been relieved of those problems, hence the extreme interest of the United States in learning all that we can about them. Are the boats capable? The Chinese certainly want us to believe so whether they are or not, and they certainly don’t want us to learn enough to make a decision either way.

Enter Impeccable, Chinese sailors in the skivvies, and two incidents earlier in the week in which Chinese military aircraft buzzed American ships and in which a Chinese destroyer cut in front of the bow of a US ship and you have the beginnings of a Chinese power play.

China has long maintained that its economic and security interests are not limited to the twelve mile international waters boundary acknowledged by all nations and they have attempted to exercise that claim on many occasions, the most famous of which was when a Chinese J-8 fighter rammed and forced down a US Navy EP3 surveillance aircraft at… wait for it… Hainan Island in April of 2001, causing a several week long crisis that saw the Chinese first downing the aircraft and then engaging in that most Chinese action, disassembling it to steal its technology.

The Chinese were trying to do something very similar with Impeccable when they got doused with the fire hoses—they were using their boat hooks to try and snag and steal the sonar towed array cables being pulled by the ship while at the same time trying to exercise their claim on waters far beyond those they are entitled to.

Given the timing, with the first meeting between Hu and Obama on the near horizon, it is easy to imagine what the Chinese are up to. With America in financial crisis and with its military distracted by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China is trying to upset the balance of power quickly before America under Obama can regain its footing. It’s hard to blame them—they are in no position to directly challenge an America that can respond at full strength, so why not challenge America while it is still weakened from the misadventures of the previous Admin and under financial pressure that China can make worse? In some ways this is very much like the Soviet provocations that accompanied the beginning of the Kennedy Administration; the question now is whether or not Obama will respond from strength, sending Impeccable and its sister ships back to the waters off of Hainan with a military escort or whether he is too constrained by China’s economic position to do so.

Undoubtedly Hu will come to the meeting with demands that the United States back off in the East Pacific, Yellow and South China Seas or else China will have to consider economic actions detrimental to the United States. The gravity of those threats will be easily determined—if they are made publicly or are allowed to leak very quickly, then China will be placing its prestige and power on the line by directly challenging America, signaling that they think they have a seriously strong hand. If they are made quietly and without fanfare, then they are merely a test of America’s resolve. China has traditionally been hesitant to engage in open confrontation, preferring the subtle maneuver to the exercise of main force. This will be an interesting exercise in power for both sides. Expect to see China take steps on the economic front in the coming ten days, perhaps a Chinese professor giving a “major interview” questioning the continued wisdom of helping the US economy or perhaps a signal from China’s Central Bank that it is considering dumping US Treasuries, to ratchet up the pressure on Obama.

We all know the ancient Chinese curse about living in interesting times. It will be a major test of Obama’s capacity to lead in seeing if he can make China’s life equally interesting.

Posted in China, Economy, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence (and lack thereof), Submarines, Warfare | 2 Comments »

Orbital Bumper Cars or A Message Sent Via Communications Satellite?

Posted by Bob Kohm on February 12, 2009

The New York Times is reporting that for the first time two large satellites have collided in orbit, an American Iridium sat-phone orbiter and what has been described as an “inoperatve Russian communications satellite”. The debris from the collision of the two spacecraft is a potential disaster for other spacecraft; indeed the International Space Station and its crew is already in danger from the debris field, which is expanding through not only its orbit but also through that of hundreds of other birds.

This mess is reminiscent of the January 11, 2007 Chinese intercept of a satellite in a demonstration of their ability to take out militarily significant sats. The Chinese came under fire from all quarters for the irresponsible test/poke in the eye which resulted in a gigantic cloud of orbital debris in an already crowded orbital path. Satellites, despite the rough journey they follow to get into orbit, are extraordinarily delicate instruments and can be easily damaged by tiny, high velocity mini-meteors and bits of space junk; huge chunks of defunct satellite are not, thus, a good thing. Worse, the bits of debris need to be tracked as their orbits change due to the initial energy of the impact and then either settle into an orbit or, more likely, degrade across many other orbits. Think about that– take two 1200+ pound plus machines loaded with ceramics and metals, smash them into each other at 17,000+ mph and then consider how many pieces they will break into. Now track the larger parts that can be resolved on radar for weeks, months, and years as they first expand their orbital paths and then plunge back through the orbital paths of thousands of other spacecraft on their way to burning up in the atmosphere sometime over the next few weeks to years. It is, to simplify, not good.

There are larger issues here. The first is that orbital space is getting very, very crowded as redundant sats are launched to do jobs that satellites of competitors are already doing while other satellites fail and replacements are launched, with new birds going up all the while for new purposes. Some say these collisions will become inevitable, although to this point only three smaller accidental collisions have been recorded. Sooner or later, either satellite design is going to have to dramatically change to deal with collisions (most likely an impossibility) or satellite losses are going to become more frequent, a problem that will grow exponentially as the failure by destruction of one satellite will lead to a debris field which in turn may well destroy others. It’s quite a mess.

The other concern here is that since these were an American and Russian satellite and the collision happened over Siberia that we have a Chinese test redux happening here. There have been rumors in the past that the US was covering some of its intelligence satellites as Iridium constellation birds, an exchange that was allegedly worked out as the US government bolstered the technologically brilliant but fiscally disastrous early Iridium days. Additionally, the US military and intelligence agencies make extensive use of the Iridium satellite phone system, and the satellite destroyed was, coincidentally, the one that would handle transmissions from a swath of Central Asia, already the arena of US-Russian competition in the previous few weeks as the Russians have sought to hamper our Afghan War effort by shutting down the Kyrgyz Manas air base to us.  Could this have actually been a Russian demonstration of their capacity to intercept an American satellite? There is some logic to it when you consider the belligerence of the Putin-Medvedyev regime as well as the “Test Obama” ethos that our rivals can be expected to adopt and indeed some have, especially the Russians. It’s also hard to imagine that this collision came as a surprise, given how closely satellites are tracked in orbit– it suggests that one of those satellites was actively maneuvering to get close o the other, otherwise this collision would likely have been seen coming in advance. I’ll be keeping an eye on Aviation Week (aka AvLeak) over the next few weeks amongst other sources to see what buzz pops up.

Either way, accident or attack, this is a nasty situation and one we will likely be visiting and revisiting in the future as space not only continues to fill up but also as its strategic importance is magnified.

Posted in Foreign Affairs, Intelligence (and lack thereof), NASA, Russia, Space, Warfare | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

What Didn’t Happen on 9-25

Posted by Bob Kohm on February 2, 2009

With the change in Administration we’ve heard an awful lot about what George W. Bush’s sole saving grace is supposed to be: that America was not attacked again for the seven years following 9-11. I’m still left to wonder why.

If we posit that the 9-11 attacks were a sophisticated and complex operation requiring the coordination of scores of attackers, logisticians and money movers then we similarly must posit that al Qaeda was, at least at that time, a sophisticated and complex organization capable of organizing the strikes.

Yet on 9-25 no bombs went off in subway cars or on buses.

al Qaeda was able to attain flight training within the United States for several hijackers. They were also able to coordinate an attack in Afghanistan two days before 9-11 to kill the leader of the Northern Alliance by infiltrating two fake photojournalists into his heavily guarded camp and killing him with a bomb concealed within a working minicam.

Yet on 9-25 no men with simple assault rifles attacked a shopping mall.

The African Embassy bombings were carried out simultaneously on August 7, 1998 in Kenya & Tanzania, using sophisticated explosives mounted in trucks. Although the bomb didn’t penetrate the Embassy perimeter in Dar es Salaam, the truck in Nairobi effectively destroyed the American embassy while the Dar es Salaam truck killed 11 and wounded 86.

Yet on 9-25 nobody staged an attack on a school. In 1999 two teenagers carried out a massacre in a school in Colorado. In 2007 a single student killed 32 at Virginia Tech.

In October of 2000, al Qaeda staged the attack on the USS Cole, blowing a 40 foot hole in an American warship and killing 17 American sailors.

Yet on 9-25 nobody staged an attack on an apartment building.

I’ve always been at a loss to understand what al Qaeda was thinking in the planning of the 9-11 attacks and in their aftermath. The twin attacks in New York and Washington were obviously large scale attacks made to demonstrate that the United States could be attacked and attacked in spectacular fashion. Think back to those dark days on September, 2001; remember how jumpy we all were and how fear had taken hold beneath the veneer of resolution and the layers of outrage that we all wore.

What would’ve happened if two weeks later, just as we all started to get back into our work-a-day routines, a series of low tech, simple operations had been carried out? A suicide bomber detonates himself on a Cleveland bus, as has happened so many times in Israel. A couple of days later a bomb goes off on a BART train in San Francisco. These aren’t sophisticated attacks; if you have the online skills to find this blog you also have the skills to find a site that will show you how to build a simple backpack bomb and carry out this attack. Suddenly going to work is something we fear.

A few days later two men with assault rifles or submachineguns walk up to a schoolyard at recess and mow down the students. The reload twice before the police arive and a hundred kids die. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris had a more sophisticated plan requiring far greater logistical overhead. Now we’re afraid to send our kids to school.

A Saturday or two later a pair of gunmen walk into a mall and open up at the foodcourt during lunchtime. Maybe a third lobs a hand grenade or some simple IED into Macys. Now we’re afraid to shop or maybe even go anywhere that people congregate.

At three o’clock Sunday morning a truck bomb goes off after having crashed into the lobby of an apartment building. If Tim McVeigh and Timothy Nichols can pull it off with some diesel and some fertilizer, we can agree this isn’t something that takes much sophistication or planning– this isn’t Pearl Harbor we’re talking about. Now we’re afraid to sleep, and the country is paralyzed.

And none of these things happened in the weeks after 9-11. They aren’t the products of some great strategic mind, redolent of subtlety and deep thought. They don’t require massive transfers of money or logistic support. Highly trained operators– like men capable of piloting a commercial airliner– are not required. None of these attacks happened, despite the screaming obviousness of the logic that dictated them.

Attributing the failure of these attacks to happen obviously doesn’t go to American intelligence or law enforcement efforts– there is no reasonable way, even today, to prevent two or three guys with SMGs from walking into Roosevelt Field or Mall of America or Tyson’s Galleria or the elementary school down the street from your house. So, does this mean that al Qaeda either didn’t have the vision or the capability to pull off these attacks? Or did al Qaeda not have the desire to press their attack and shut down America?

I have my own theories about why al Qaeda didn’t reel in the fish after getting it to take the bait and after setting the hook, but the reality is that without bin Laden or al Zawahiri in custody and talking we are likely never going to know why our country literally dodged the bullet that any rational foe would’ve fired into us in the weeks following 9-11. The nightmare scenario was there for the taking, and was available at low cost and with no special effort made to pull the trigger. After the massive attacks of 9-11, every pinprick attack that could have come in the following weeks would have registered as sledgehammer blows. It didn’t materialize.

If we cannot answer why these attacks didn’t happen beyond saying that President Bush had no influence on them, should we really be crediting ex-President Bush with further spectacular attacks not happening? I don’t have a yes or no answer to that. Neither should history, despite what the George W. Bush Presidential Library will eventually be telling us.

Posted in American History, American Politics, Bush, Intelligence (and lack thereof), Islamists, terrorism | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

The Tortured Compass

Posted by Bob Kohm on January 14, 2009

This morning the Washington Post is carrying a story largely dealing with the case of Mohammed al-Qahtani, a man who sought entry to the United States in August of 2001 with the intention of participating in the September 11th hijackings. al-Qahtani was subsequently captured in early in the Afghanistan War and shipped to Guantanamo Bay in January of 2002 for interrogation.

That al-Qahtani was treated at Guantanamo in a way that nobody reading this blog would ever wish to be treated goes without saying. Findings of an investigation by Susan Crawford, who is in charge of the military investigations into Gitmo, show that al-Qahtani was deprived of sleep, clothing, and heat, was forced to appear naked and was strip searched by female interrogators, was ordered to perform “dog” tricks while on a leash, was menaced by a military working dog and was interrogated for between eighteen and twenty hours a day for forty-eight of fifty-four days. According to Ms. Crawford, this meets the legal definition of torture, despite the fact that no single grave application of pain or injury was performed.

I do not believe that torture should be used as an interrogation technique in almost any circumstance. I believe that most of my fellow Americans would agree with that, but only because of the qualification at the end of the sentence– “…in almost any circumstance”.  Like most moral-legal issues in the United States, I believe that there are ten percent of Americans at one pole– “No torture, ever, under any circumstance”– and ten at the other– “Heh, did you see what Jack Bauer did to that guy?”. That vast middle is gradated, surely, but it is also where most of us reside; persuadable by a good argument, but also clinging to both emotional response and what we see as clear pragmatism.

Taken so soon after September 11th and what we thought might be the related anthrax attacks, al-Qahtani was without question a valuable intelligence asset and one worthy of thorough interrogation. There was the possibility that he was privy to other planned operations or to the network infrastructure that disseminated the 9-11 plans down to the field operatives who carried it out. He may have had contact with command nodes, he may have had contact with logistics support people, he may have had contact with unknown planning and ops cells active in Europe and the United States– clearly we needed to know what he did (and didn’t) know so that we could gain a better insight into the enemy’s organization and perhaps head off further attacks. Again, given the temporal proximity to the attacks and the fact that the clock might be ticking towards the next attack, it is understandable that the CIA, DOD, and whatever other acronyms took a shot at him wanted to get his information quickly, while it was still fresh and before alQaeda could adapt to his capture.

But torture?

Here’s where we run into the sticking points. Interrogation, done in the correct way, is a lengthy, carefully conducted process of plucking just the right strings often enough that the subject confuses his loyalties, loses hope, or sees benefit to giving up what he knows. That is obviously in contravention to what those controlling his interrogators felt that they needed– quick, accurate information to head off what might be impending plots that could kill thousands of Americans. Faced with that set of circumstances and a “forgiving” command authority in the Bush-Cheney White House, it is understandable– though not palatable, from my perspective– that they might turn to more aggressive   interrogation with the correct prisoners designed to provide quick and dirty answers that could be refined later. I believe that those who made the decision to greenlight aggressive interrogation techniques had no illusions about the overall accuracy of their take– torture produces lousy info– but they needed something, quickly, that would give them an indicator into the mind and planning of an enemy we didn’t understand at a time when he could be moving again.

In the case of al-Qahtani, I do not believe that they acted in the way that I as an American would want to see my government’s organs operate. We understood that a guy like al-Qahtani was muscle, not brains; he was only told enough to carry out the operation he was assigned to and nothing more. That’s nothing new– you can go back to the Narodnaya Volya of the 19th Century and see this kind of cellular terror organization– and we knew that he likely didn’t know a damned thing.

Let’s change up for a moment though and exchange al-Qahtani for someone like al-Zawahiri, the #2 in al Qaeda and the alleged brains of the operation, or someone like Khalid Sheik Muhammed, who planned and ran the 9-11 operation. If we had taken one of them in the first weeks after the attacks, what then? They would have the data in their heads to destroy any current attack planning and potentially to roll up the entire alQaeda network if we acted quickly enough to get that information. Is this where that phrase, “…in almost any circumstances…” meets its application?

I’m guessing that the middle would agree that “enhanced interrogation techniques” like waterboarding, sleep deprivation, etc would be called for in the interest of stopping an attack. I bet those on the further reaches of the middle spectrum would also be OK with blowtorches, electric generators and anything else someone in a Romanian CIA detention center could think of. I also bet that those same people are kind to their neighbors, adopt shelter dogs and cats and give to charity.

This great American middle, this body of people that the world thinks it has figured out, are a fickle bunch that defy easy description. They’re (we’re) a topic I plan to touch on quite frequently in this blog as I don’t think there’s a cultural phenomenon at work in this world right now more interesting or with a greater capacity for joy or pain. Principled, yes, but too pragmatic to rely solely on principles; too emotional to rely solely on pragmatism, too. Are they just uncommitted, weak willed and willing to blow in the wind, or are they something else, a force that moves towards reality when confronted with the ethereal? We torture ourselves over torturing those who wish to hurt us, but we still do torture them despite outrage and pity that I think many feel in their hearts when looking at the aftermath.

North is always in the same place, but we can only find north by looking at the shifting arrow of the compass.Is the case of al-Qahtani a point that the compass moves toward, or is it the center that it pivots around?

Posted in Cultural Phenomena, Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Intelligence (and lack thereof) | Tagged: , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Pakistan’s Troubling Nukes

Posted by Bob Kohm on January 12, 2009

pakistanThe Sunday New York Times Magazine ran an interesting piece on the question of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal last weekend, focusing largely on the twin concepts of stockpile security and political stability. It’s a lengthy read, but well worth the time; you can find it here.

The article focuses mainly on the efforts and difficulties of one Khalid Kidwai, the Director of Pakistan’s Office of Strategic Plans. Mr. Kidwai is, effectively, in charge of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and arsenal whose existence creates for Mr. Kidwai many foes. The article speaks of Indian saboteurs, alQaeda penetration agents, various and sundry other Islamist groups seeking the entree to the power of the atom, and American commandos whom Kidwai presumes are waiting at the ready to swoop in and take Pakistan’s arsenal back to America at the first sign of major instability within Pakistan.

Pakistan poses a unique problem for the United States, and, indeed, the Western world. A technologically advanced nation still buried in crushing poverty, a modern state struggling with an immense Medieval fundamentalist movement, an urban nation bounded by a lawless mountain territory that it can exercise no control over, Pakistan is the prototypical land of contradiction. That contradiction extends, troublingly, to the fact that while this is a state advanced enough to create and use nuclear weapons, it is also backwards enough to give the world little or no confidence in its stewardship of those weapons.

Pakistan’s internal justification for being a nuclear-armed state is clear enough on the surface levels– it sits next door to and upon land formerly owned by the much large India, which has been pursuing nuclear weapons for decades and has many clear strategic advantages over Pakistan, not the least of which is the sheer size of its population. Throughout the latter days of the Cold War, the United States & Soviet Union vied for the friendship and alliance of these putatively “non-aligned” nations, with India favoring Russia while Pakistan has gravitated towards American arms and power. One result of that constant four-handed gamesmanship was that neither the Soviets nor the Americans were willing to bring much pressure on nations like India, Pakistan or even South Africa to halt their weapons research; doing so too overtly would decisively push any of these nations to the orbit of the rival Great Power, thus we held our collective tongues. As a result India and Pakistan made all of the necessary moves to create nuclear weapons technology while South Africa built its first atomic weapons and dismantled them. With the knowledge that India was proceeding at full pace towards atomic and eventually nuclear weapons, Pakistan felt it had no choice but to reciprocate.

Pakistan’s path to nuclear weaponry was marked by two visionary scientist who contributed greatly not just to Pakistan’s ability to field a nuclear arsenal but also to the world’s disquiet over the arsenal’s presence. A.Q. Khan is a name well known– the father of Pakistan’s program, Khan freelanced his knowledge, plans (both created and stolen), and technical expertise to other states desiring nuclear weapons, states such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, and supposedly Syria. The question of whether his motivations were strictly monetary or if they were influenced by his religious beliefs remains somewhat open; the Pakistanis have kept Khan under house arrest and have not made him available to Western intelligence agencies of civilian entities to answer questions. The other scientist was Sultan Bashirood Mahmood, and he is a stickier situation– an avowed Islamist and Islamic Fundamentalist who has referred to Pakistan’s stockpile as the “Islamic Bomb” and who has sought to share his knowledge and expertise to countries and groups based on their “Islamic Purity” to balance out the “Zionist” bomb.

Mr. Kidwai surely has his work cut out for him.

Further complicating a picture already crazyquilt with concerns over security and stewardship is the fact that Pakistan is, to be kind, a political mess. From the open air arms bazaars of Peshawar, where a NATO supply depot & convoy was just shot up, from the Khyber Pass, the Main Supply Route for US forces in Afghanistan which was recently closed by Pakistan due to operations against rebellious tribes, to the madrassas and militant mosques of the big cities, Pakistan is sure of only one politically reality every night when she goes to bed and upon awakening every morning– that today could be the day.

Politically troubled almost since its inception, Pakistan has in recent years gone through a series of asassinaitons, attempted and completed coups, a military dictatorship and democratically elected leaders whose elections were the subject of much scrutiny & derision. Their own government institutions are totally unreliable; the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, has worked openly against Pakistan’s previous three administrations and is an exporter and facilitator of terrorist operations– the latest of which appears to have been the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. The ISI was also the major facilitator of the Taleban takeover of neighboring Afghanistan, with all the excesses and terrorist attacks that entailed. The ISI shares a compound with Kidwai’s own nuclear security operation and is rumored to have the program itself thoroughly infiltrated.

Amongst those vying for political control in Pakistan are vehement anti-Indians, who seek a war over the disputed province of Kashmir, organized fundamentalist cliques, elements from within the ISI, democratic reformers and latter-day communists. The military, which installed Pervez Musharraff, also can never be counted out as the next government of Pakistan. The “tribal areas” of Pakistan, places like Baluchistan and Waziristan, also harbor large armed bands of dedicated Islamists who are believed to be sheltering Osama bin Laden and are a tremendous force for political instability within Pakistan.

What would happen if the ISI, with its fundamentalist leanings and penchant for large scale anti-Western terrorist operations, teamed up with their allies in the tribal regions or with one of the urban Islamist factions to topple the government and install their own? In such a scenario we would be looking at a government with similar religio-political leanings as those held by the Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary forces in Iran… but with a highly organized paramilitary/intelligence operation already up and running to enforce internal security and export trouble.

In such a scenario, the first and most hopeful outcome would be for the military to fight it out with ISI and the Islamists in the streets; such a happening is foreseeable as a possibility, but not terribly likely, The fact is that the Pakistani Army & Air Force, equipped largely with modern American weaponry, are shot through with Islamists and Islamist sympathizers; I would be surprised to see them fighting to keep Pakistan a secular nation in the face of an Islamist coup.

A more likely scenario, perhaps, is that the coup takes hold quickly and with the support of the military, leaving the United States with a series of choices– intervene? Put Mr. Kidwai’s notional American commandos into action to take out Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure? Wait and hope for the best? Encourage India to move on Pakistan?

There is, of course, no opportunity for large scale military intervention into an Islamist coup in Pakistan for America– it would be totally unsustainable and our forces would be constantly in an environment perhaps worse than the one prophesied for the invasion of Japan. Are those commandos waiting? In the waning months of the Musharraf egime in 2008, possibly, perhaps even with the knowledge of Mr. Musharraf. Now, that is highly unlikely– we most likely don’t even know the extent of their dispersion of the nuclear force in times of peace, much less crisis. India would not be inclined to go to war with Pakistan under Islamist, either– much too likely that when India ran roughshod over the smaller Pakistani forces that the Islamabad regime may see a nuclear exchange as an inviting scenario.

The question quickly devolves to this– do we want an extremely hostile Islamic nation sitting idly around looking for mischief and with the connections to make it or do we act precipitously to take out their ability to put our cities at risk through low-tech deliverable nuclear warheads?

Quite a question, that.

Posted in Foreign Affairs, Intelligence (and lack thereof), Islamists, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Warfare | Tagged: , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Leon Panetta at CIA Means Bad Things Long Term for DNI

Posted by Bob Kohm on January 5, 2009

cialogo

It is no secret that many view the CIA as, once again, a broken organization. Still reeling from the triple blows of the selective intelligence scandal that led to the disastrous   briefing before the start of the Iraq War, the indignity of the DCI having to answer to an “Intelligence Czar” after the 9/11 Commission Report hit and the misadventures of some of the folks on the Ops side of the house, CIA is little more than a gaggle of intelligent analysts working under a shell shocked and demoralized hierarchy of GS-15s and SES appointees trying to regain some swagger and find a direction. Sure, the meta-stuff is out there– track bin Laden, analyze alQ data, keep an eye on China & Russia, get a handle on the developing Egyptian situation, etc.– but that stuff is almost background noise at this point; it’s the stoplight idling of a sports car engine.

Enter management guru but intelligence naif Leon Panetta. Panetta is nobody’s idea of a DCI– he’s a political guy who happens to be good at running organizations; at the top level he doesn’t seem like someone who can restore the sense of purpose and bravado to the Agency. 

He’s actually uniquely suited to do so.

Barack Obama is a very pragmatic guy; some in the GOP may crow (still… yawn) about Democrats meaning big government, but I believe that Obama will be looking to set his government as an efficient machine and kick off the training wheels when he has confidence in each component. When I consider that the whole DNI overlord position is just another layer of bureaucracy rather than a true coordinator of disparate agencies and departments and hear in the background that idling engine stuck in traffic at Langley I start to see something new emerging. 

Leon Panetta is a mechanic. He’s there to tune the engine and fix the machine so that it can run on its own again. 

Panetta’s entire skill set revolves around taking malfunctioning bureaucracies and government institutions and making them work; look at the discipline and efficiency he imposed upon the biggest group of glory hounds we’ve seen in recent years, the Clinton Cabinet. If Mr. Panetta can bring that kind of efficiency and purpose to Langley, CIA may again become the useful tool that it once was and that I believe Mr. Obama intends for it to be again. If CIA under Panetta can gain the confidence of Obama in two years, I would look for the office of DNI to first be downplayed and then, eventually, eliminated as a cost savings to the American Government.

Dennis Blair, who will be installed at DNI, is exactly the intel pro who can keep the operations and analysis flowing while Panetta acts as a one man HR & Organizational Review shop. Put them together and you have the chance of CIA coming out of this being what it should actually be– a flexible organization that while task oriented also follows a long term strategic trajectory and does so without internal drama. Dare to dream.

As for the politics of the announcement, this one was a beauty. While incoming Chair of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee Diane von Furstenberg Feinstein got her designer togs all wrinkled rushing to find the nearest mic to scream into today over Panetta being chosen against her stated desires and without her even being consulted, other members of Senate Select Intel (notably the gentleman from Oregon) were waiting to cut her off at the knees with the acknowledgement that they had been consulted.

The whole announcement drama can be traced back to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s very public bitch-slapping of Rahm Emmanuel while he was effectively gagged by Patrick Fitzgerald and the Blago mess. Madame Speaker very kindly (and publicly) advised Emmanuel that not only was his advice and counsel not needed nor welcomed when the topic was House Leadership and procedure but that the incoming President was not allowed to speak to any member of the Democratic Caucus in the House without what amounted to her permission, and that the President was then to provide her with a debrief of every conversation that she chose to allow.  It would seem that Ms. Pelosi’s powerplay was deemed in need of a similarly public reversal, hence Mr. Obama choosing to embarrass the hell out of Pelosi ally Feinstein today by goign under, around, and over her without a word on the nomination. She’s not in a position to torpedo the nomination– Panetta has too many friends that Feinstein relies upon, and besides there’s no way any Dem is going to get in the way of the juggernaut that will be the Confirmation Hearings and come out unscathed.

In the end the Panetta pick is a slightly risky one for Obama– should CIA have some great failing in the next year due to a lack of professionalism, having a non-intel guy at the helm will look bad– but one that could pay high dividends, both in the return to function of the CIA as well as in undoing the dopey DNI implementation. That it sevred as an object lesson in power politics to Speaker Pelosi, Senator Reid and all other interested parties– well, that was just cake.

Posted in American Politics, Intelligence (and lack thereof), Obama Cabinet | Tagged: , , , , | 1 Comment »

 
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